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Law, non-law, and torture: from the Consolidated Guidance to the Principles 
Paul F Scott 




The document called The Principles relating to the detention and interviewing of detainees overseas and the 
passing and receipt of intelligence relating to detainees1 attempts to address a possibility that is ever-
present in the modern national security landscape: that the United Kingdom and its agents 
become indirectly complicit in the mistreatment of those detained by its allies or partners abroad, 
whether that mistreatment amounts to torture, or to the lower category of ‘cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment’. First made public in 2010, the Principles has recently been revised (and 
renamed)2 in order to reflect some of the lessons learned from what has emerged since then 
about the UK’s indirect (but sometimes also direct) involvement in the mistreatment of persons 
detained abroad by its allies and/or rendered by them from one jurisdiction to another. This 
article offers a critique of the Principles against the background of the document’s evolution over 
time, arguing that it reflects many of the same flaws which characterise more generally oversight 
in the national security domain. The Principles is a public document, applied mostly in secret. It 
originally represented a bare minimum, originating in response to actions whose 
inappropriateness was manifest quite apart from the question of any guidance which was or was 
not available. It has been specifically identified as having as part of its purpose the 
communication to the public the impression that the United Kingdom’s government takes 
seriously the possibility of mistreatment and is appropriately opposed to it, and yet for many 
years contained a number of lacunae which prevented it from fulfilling that role convincingly. 
Others remain. Oversight of compliance with the document has been at times informal, and 
often too weak; oversight of the document itself has been ad hoc and belated.  
 
                                                     
1 HM Government, The Principles relating to the detention and interviewing of detainees overseas and the passing and 
receipt of intelligence relating to detainees (July 2019) (‘Principles’). 
2 Formerly, the document was HM Government, Consolidated Guidance to Intelligence Officers and Service 
Personnel on the Detention and Interviewing of Detainees Overseas, and on the Passing and Receipt of Intelligence Relating 
to Detainees (July 2010) (‘Consolidated Guidance’). See the letter from Sir Adrian Fulford, the Investigatory 
Powers Commissioner, to the Prime Minister (12 July 2019): ‘…the Consolidated Guidance did not 
provide guidance. Instead, it set out principles that are to be applied in a range of differing circumstances. 
Furthermore, the title “Consolidated Guidance” will henceforth be significantly misleading, given this 
new draft cannot sensibly be viewed as a “consolidation” of other documents, which in any event are 
largely now forgotten.’ 
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Though the recent round of reforms has addressed some of the substantive problems, it 
did not – because it could not – alter the fundamental status of the document and the difficulties 
which flow from that. That is, the Principles is a constitutional oddity. Though public lawyers are 
well accustomed to non-legal rules (whether soft law, or convention, or something else)3 which 
seek either to fill the gaps in the body of formal legal rules or to guide the exercise of legal 
powers, the Principles does neither of these things. Instead, it sits on top of the law, allegedly 
replicating its content, but in fact distracting from and potentially distorting it. In this sense, the 
document demonstrates some of the dangers inherent in the preference for non-legal over legal 
regulation, and in turn the limitations of the project of rationalisation and codification which has 
been carried out in the constitutional order in recent decades.  
 
2. The legal context 
 
The UK is a signatory to the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (‘UNCAT’), Article 2 of which requires those 
states party to it to ‘take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent 
acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction.’4 In pursuance of the UK’s duties under the 
Convention, section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 provides that a ‘public official or 
person acting in an official capacity’ commits the offence of torture if ‘in the United Kingdom or 
elsewhere he intentionally inflicts severe pain or suffering on another in the performance or 
purported performance of his official duties.’5 For the purpose of this offence, it does not matter 
‘whether the pain or suffering is physical or mental and whether it is caused by an act or an 
omission’.6 Perhaps crucially, the 1988 Act makes it a defence ‘for a person charged with an 
offence under this section in respect of any conduct of his to prove that he had lawful authority, 
justification or excuse for that conduct’.7 This provision may result in legal liability even where 
the pain or suffering in question is inflicted by an agent of a foreign service. First of all, the 
                                                     
3 See Aileen McHarg, ‘Reforming the United Kingdom Constitution: Law, Convention, Soft Law’ (2008) 
71 Modern Law Review 853. 
4 United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, Article 2(1). Torture is defined by the Convention as ‘any act by which severe pain or 
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining 
from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has 
committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for 
any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the 
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official 
capacity.’: UNCAT, Article 1(1). 
5 Criminal Justice Act 1988, s 134(1). 
6 CJA 1988, s 134(1). 
7 CJA 1988, s 134(4). 
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Accessories and Abettors Act 1861 provides that ‘[w]hosoever shall aid, abet, counsel, or procure 
the commission of any indictable offence, whether the same be at common law or by virtue of 
any Act passed or to be passed, shall be liable to be tried, indicted, and punished as a principal 
offender.’8 Moreover, the Serious Crime Act 2007 creates a range of offences relating to assisting 
or encouraging primary offences, which can be committed by a person ‘whether or not any 
offence capable of being encouraged or assisted by his act is committed.’9 States party to 
UNCAT also undertake to prevent within their jurisdiction ‘acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment which do not amount to torture’ (‘CIDT’), but CIDT is not defined in 
the Convention. Though it has no authoritative definition in UK law,10 many forms of CIDT will 
be contrary to, for example, the Offences Against the Person Act 1861.  
 
Alongside UNCAT, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’) 
and the European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’) both prohibit torture, with the latter 
– due to its incorporation into domestic law – being the more significant of the two. Article 3 of 
the Convention provides that ‘[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment.’11 In an important line of case law, the Court of Human Rights has 
held that Article 3 prevents the extradition or deportation of a person to a third state where 
‘substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person concerned… faces a real risk 
of being subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the 
requesting country.’12 The effect is that the bar upon the torture (and CIDT) acts as a limit not 
only upon how agents of the state can treat those in their custody, but also upon their options 
for transferring them into the custody of other states. No derogation is possible from the 
provisions of Article 3. One response to these facts has been the emergence of the practice of 
‘deportation with assurances’, under which the UK seeks ‘assurances from the government of 
the receiving state which are sufficiently credible to allow deportation to take place without 
infringing the human rights of the deportee or the obligations of the state under international 
law.’13 Though the Court of Human Rights has held that this process is capable of operating 
                                                     
8 Accessories and Abettors Act 1861, s 8. 
9 Serious Crime Act 2007, s 49(1). 
10 For an American perspective, see David Weissbrodtt and Cheryl Heilman, ‘Defining Torture and Cruel, 
Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment’ (2011) 29 Law and Inequality 343. 
11 European Convention on Human Rights, Article 3. 
12 Soering v United Kingdom (1989) 11 EHRR 439, [91]. See also, in the context of deportation rather than 
extradition, Chahal v. United Kingdom (1996) 23 EHRR 413. 
13 David Anderson QC (with Clive Walker QC), Deportation with Assurances, Cm 9462 (July 2017), [1.2]. 
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compatibly with the Convention,14 difficulties in acquiring suitably reliable assurances have 
meant that relatively limited use of the practice has been made.15  
 
Moreover, the application of the ECHR is limited by the terms of Article 1, which 
requires Contracting Parties to ‘secure to everyone within their jurisdiction’ the rights in question. 
Though the decision of the Strasbourg Court in Al-Skeini16 has increased the range of situations 
in which jurisdiction might be held to exist outside of the territory of the state,17 this remains 
exceptional, and there will be no jurisdiction in the majority of cases to which the Principles 
applies. One point causes particular difficulty: how does the Convention treat the situation in 
which a British citizen is outside the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom and is, by virtue of 
being deprived of his or her citizenship, put beyond the reach of the Convention and (perhaps) 
at risk of torture or CIDT? At the moment no answer is available,18 and the government has 
argued that the deprivation of the citizenship of a person outside its territory does not, under the 
principles so far elaborated by the Strasbourg Court, engage the Convention;19 that the mere fact 
of nationality creates no jurisdictional link. If this is correct, then in circumstances in which the 
United Kingdom could not and would not extradite a person to a foreign jurisdiction, it could 
nevertheless lawfully divest itself of responsibility for the treatment of such persons by removing 
their citizenship while they are already in the custody of the foreign power, renouncing any sort 
of duty of protection to those persons.20 This is a troubling conclusion, but one which is 
consistent with the manner in which jurisdiction under the ECHR has so far been unpacked. 
Moreover, UK authorities could do so consistently with the Principles, which applies – as we shall 
see – to a limited range of forms of collaboration or interaction, some of them significantly less 




                                                     
14 Othman (Abu Qatada) v United Kingdom (2012) 55 EHRR 1. 
15 See Anderson (n 13) [3.33]-[3.50]. 
16 Al-Skeini v United Kingdom [2011] ECHR 1093. 
17 See Smith v Secretary of State for Defence [2013] UKSC 41 and, considering the outer limits of the 
extraterritorial jurisdiction of the EHCR, Al-Saadoon v Secretary of State for Defence [2016] EWCA Civ 811. 
18 The point is not considered in, for example, the admissibility decision in K2 v United Kingdom (2017) 64 
EHRR SE18. 
19 Home Office, Immigration Bill - European Convention on Human Rights - Supplementary Memorandum (January 
2014) [16].  
20 Though see Home Office (n 19) [16]: ‘the Home Secretary has a practice of not depriving individuals of 
British citizenship when they are not within the UK’s jurisdiction for ECHR purposes if she is satisfied 
that doing so would expose those individuals to a real risk of treatment which would constitute a breach 
of Articles 2 or 3 if they were within the UK’s jurisdiction and those articles were engaged.’ 
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The years since 2001 have seen a number of inquiries take place into the treatment by the UK of 
detainees in the early years of the Global War on Terror and.21 Two reports were published by 
the Intelligence and Security Committee in 2005 and 2007,22 though are widely recognised – 
including by the Committee itself – to have been inadequate in a number of respects. A judge-led 
inquiry, the Gibson inquiry, was set up in 2010 but brought to a premature end while criminal 
inquiries into related issues were ongoing.23 On the same day the Gibson inquiry was announced, 
the Government published for the first time the Consolidated Guidance, publication of which had 
been taken place a year earlier.24 By the time it was determined, however, that no criminal 
charges would be brought in the most prominent of the cases – relating to the UK’s involvement 
in the kidnap and rendition of Abdelhakim Belhaj and his wife to Libya in 200425  – the matters 
had been handed (back) over instead to the ISC, albeit a long with a loose commitment to having 
a full judge-led inquiry at some future time.26  
 
In the intervening period, further attention had been paid as a result of the killing of 
Fusilier Lee Rigby, and a report – also by the ISC – on issues around intelligence relating to that 
murder.27 One of the killers, Michael Adebolajo, claimed to have been mistreated while detained 
in Kenya but the security and intelligence agencies (‘SIAs’) strongly rejected the suggestion that 
the Guidance applied to his circumstances.28  Though the ISC felt that position to be ‘arguable’ 
given that the Guidance was ‘tightly drawn’, it noted that Adebolajo had been interviewed not only 
by Kenyan police but also by ‘a counter-terrorism unit’ with ‘a close working relationship’ with 
                                                     
21 On which see Ruth Blakeley and Sam Raphael, ‘British Torture in the “War on Terror”’ (2017) 23 
European Journal of International Relation 243. 
22 Intelligence and Security Committee, The Handling of Detainees by UK Intelligence Personnel in Afghanistan, 
Guantanamo Bay and Iraq, Cm 6469 (2005); Intelligence and Security Committee, Rendition, Cm 7171 
(2007). 
23 HC Deb 18 January 2012, vol 538 cols 751-2 and the Detainee Inquiry, The Report of the Detainee Inquiry 
(December 2013). 
24 See the timeline at Detainee Inquiry (n 23) 10-21.  
25 See Crown Prosecution Service statement: ‘Operation Lydd’ (9 June 2016). The matter was considered 
twice – from very different angles – by the Supreme Court: Belhaj v Straw [2017] UKSC 3 and Belhaj v 
Director of Public Prosecutions [2018] UKSC 33. 
26 ‘The Government fully intend to hold a judge-led inquiry into these issues, once it is possible to do so 
and all related police investigations have been concluded.’ HC Deb 18 January 2012, vol 538 col 752 (Ken 
Clarke). 
27 Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, Report on the intelligence relating to the murder of Fusilier 
Lee Rigby (HC 2014-15, 795). For the government’s response see Government Response to the Intelligence and 
Security Committee of Parliament Report on the Intelligence Relating to the Murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby, Cm 9012 
(February 2015). 
28 ‘SIS had no prior knowledge of plans to detain Adebolajo, or that the detention was about to take 
place, nor had SIS ever previously discussed this individual with the Kenyans… once SIS learned of his 
arrest and the immediate plans to deport him SIS did not seek to interview Adebolajo, feed in questions 
or seek intelligence information.’ ISC (n 27) [466]. 
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the UK Government, though the significant redaction typical of an ISC report makes it difficult 
for the outsider know exactly what the nature of that relationship is.29 Regardless, it is clear that 
the relationship was a sufficiently close one that the ISC would have expected MI6 to attempt to 
ascertain against whom the complaint was being made.30 Beyond that specific case, the 
Committee expressed more general concern about the handling of such allegations by UK 
authorities.31 There followed from this report a supplement by the Intelligence Services 
Commissioner to his annual report, focussing on the ISC’s concerns about the government’s 
responsibilities as regards foreign counter-terrorism units with which it partners.32 Amongst the 
Commissioner’s recommendations was that ‘the Cabinet Office reviews the Consolidated 
Guidance in consultation with the ISC, the intelligence services, MOD, FCO and the Home 
Office and (subject to what follows) also with SO15.’33  
 
This recommendation was reaffirmed by the Intelligence and Security Committee, which 
issued two linked reports in 2018. One, focusing upon the events was stymied by the refusal of 
the SIAs to provide the Committee with access to officers who had been ‘on the ground’.34 The 
other report, a forward-looking treatment, contained a number of conclusions about the 
Consolidated Guidance and the need for its reform:  
 
The document that we have been given provides a useful guide to the policy framework 
within which the UK intelligence and security Agencies and MoD personnel operate… 
However, the real detail is in the lower-level guidance to staff, which the Government 
does not intend to publish. The title “Consolidated Guidance” is therefore a misnomer. 
That being the case, we consider that the document should be published, but that it 
should be clearly presented as policy, not guidance.35  
                                                     
29 ISC (n 27) [467]. 
30 ‘When Adebolajo reported his mistreatment, it was not clear whether he was referring to his treatment 
by the Kenyan police, by ARCTIC, or by both… SIS did not try to establish which unit Adebolajo’s 
allegations of mistreatment referred to… This is surprising: if Adebolajo’s allegations of mistreatment did 
refer to his interview by ARCTIC then HMG could be said to have had some involvement – whether or 
not UK personnel were present in the room.’ ISC (n 27) [468]. 
31 ISC (n 27) [488]-[499]. 
32 The Rt Hon Sir Mark Waller, Report of the Intelligence Services Commissioner - Supplementary to the Annual 
Report for 2015 (HC 2015-16, 458). 
33 Waller (n 32) [21.1]. 
34 Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, Detainee Mistreatment and Rendition: 2001–2010, (HC 
2017-19, 1113). 
35 Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, Detainee Mistreatment and Rendition: Current Issues, (HC 
2017-19, 1114). For a discussion of the shortcomings of the Guidance against the background of these 
reports, see Ruth Blakeley and Sam Raphael, ‘The Prohibition against Torture: Why the UK Government 




On the day these reports were issued, the Prime Minister acknowledged, in a written statement, 
that the SIAs had made errors in their response to evidence of mistreatment by foreign partners: 
 
With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that UK personnel were working within a new 
and challenging operating environment for which, in some cases, they were not prepared. 
It took too long to recognise that guidance and training for staff was inadequate, and too 
long to understand fully and take appropriate action on the risks arising from our 
engagement with international partners on detainee issues. The Agencies responded to 
what they thought were isolated allegations and incidents of mistreatment, but the ISC 
concludes that they should have realised the extent to which others were using 
unacceptable practices as part of a systematic programme. The Agencies acknowledge 
that they did not fully understand this quickly enough and they regret not doing so.36 
 
She therefore requested that the new Investigatory Powers Commissioner ‘to consider how the 
Consolidated Guidance could be improved, taking account of the [ISC’s] views and those of civil 
society.’37 The IPC’s recommendations were accepted in full and the new Principles were issued 
the following year; on the same day, the Government resiled from its prior commitment to hold 
a judge-led inquiry on British involvement in the events that had been considered by the Gibson 




The Principles reflects (though, as discussed below, imperfectly) this legal background, starting 
from the position that the UK ‘does not participate in, solicit, encourage or condone unlawful 
killing, the use of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment (“CIDT”), or extraordinary 
rendition’ and that ‘[i]n no circumstance will UK personnel ever take action amounting to 
torture, unlawful killing, extraordinary rendition, or CIDT.’39 It then identifies a number of 
situations to the Principles applies and sets out, with a greater or lesser degree of detail, the 
                                                     
36 HC Deb 28 June 2018, vol 643 cols 40-42WS. Also announced was the payment – without admission 
of liability – to Fatima Boudchar, Belhaj’s wife. 
37 HC Deb 22 November 2018, vol 649, col 30-1WS. 
38 HC Deb 18 July 2019, vol 663 col 974: ‘the Government have decided that it is not necessary to 
establish a further inquiry. There is no policy reason to do so, given the extensive work already 
undertaken to improve policies and practices in this area. The Government’s position is also that there is 
no legal obligation.’  
39 Principles (n 1) [1]. 
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procedures to be adopted in such scenarios. These situations encompass a wider range of what 
are (rather euphemistically) called ‘outcomes’40 than was the case under the Consolidated Guidance. 
That is, the Guidance referred only to torture, CIDT and detention, and so applied where the UK 
solicited detention by a foreign partner but not where information was provided which was 
intended to result in mistreatment outside of or unrelated to detention, where rendition would 
follow, or indeed where information was passed to a foreign partner in the knowledge or belief 
that it would result in unlawful killing. This was an indefensible position: however concerning is 
torture or mistreatment (and UK involvement therein), such actions are similarly concerning and 
in some cases more so.  
 
Now, however, the Principles – as well as applying to a wider range of domestic actors,41 
and in their interactions with a wider range of foreign actors42 – include a wider range of 
‘outcomes’, applying where UK personnel ‘know or believe i) unlawful killing ii) torture, or iii) 
extraordinary rendition will result from the passing or receipt of intelligence or in interviewing 
detainees’ or ‘a real risk i) unlawful killing ii) torture iii) cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment 
iv) extraordinary rendition or rendition or v) unacceptable standards of arrest and detention will 
result from the passing or receipt of intelligence or in interviewing detainees.’43 Though these 
formulations extend the application of the new document in important ways, however, an 
intolerable gap remains. The Principles, that is, does not apply to the passing and receipt of 
intelligence wherever and whenever one of these outcomes might result. Rather, it applies only 
where one of these outcomes might result and one of a number of prior conditions is met. All of 
the conditions in question refer to detention, either actual or anticipated.44 Where there is no 
detention or prospect of detention, the Principles does not, and cannot, apply,45 and so the 
expansion of its scope to include, for example, unlawful killing, is far less significant than it at 
first seems.  
 
The effect of this limitation is best illustrated by one of these conditions, which provides 
that the Principles apply where UK personnel are ‘[p]assing intelligence to a foreign authority 
                                                     
40 Investigatory Powers Commissioner (n 2) 
41 Principles (n 1) [5]: included now are ‘Officers and staff of SO15, Metropolitan Police Service’ and 
‘Officers of the National Crime Agency’.  
42 Principles (n 1) [10]: ‘There may be occasions when UK personnel will work with non-state organisations 
or groups, where the UK’s obligations and liabilities may be different. In those circumstances, these 
Principles should apply insofar as possible.’ See Investigatory Powers Commissioner (n 2): ‘I understand 
why, in such circumstances, it might be difficult for all aspects of the Principles fully to be applied.’ 
43 Principles (n 1) [6]. 
44 Principles (n 1) [6]. 
45 Principles (n 1) [6]. 
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concerning an individual when detention is sought and there is a real risk that the foreign 
authority will unlawfully kill the individual in an extra-judicial killing rather than the individual 
being taken into custody.’46 By very clear, very deliberate implication, a real risk of extra-judicial 
killing is in itself insufficient to bring the Principles into play, and so a foreign partner which 
solicits information about an individual with the stated intention of killing him escapes the 
scrutiny of the Principles where one which floats the possibility that the individual might merely 
be detained is, if the relevant risks exists, caught by them. It is striking that the Investigatory 
Powers Commissioner, in the letter to the Prime Minister in which he set out the conclusions of 
his inquiry into the Consolidated Guidance said no more on this most crucial point than that he had 
‘determined that for the purposes of the present review the current link with detention ought to 
remain’,47 far less explanation than was offered for – for example – changing the document’s 
name. This position, and the process which led to it, is, with respect to the IPC, wholly 
inadequate, and must work to undermine the intention that the Principles operate so as to ‘protect 
British officials from legal liability and to ensure that all conduct of British officials is lawful as a 
matter of both domestic and international law.’ To explain: the passing of intelligence to foreign 
partners in the knowledge that it will be used to inform a targeted killing at the very least risks 
creating criminal liability for those who do so (a point previously made by the Joint Committee 
on Human Rights),48 just as when passing that information results in the killing of that person 
while he or she is in detention. And yet though the latter is caught by the Principles, the former is 
not: legal liability may arise notwithstanding compliance with the document. E  
 
A second difficulty with the Consolidated Guidance related to its ability to usefully guide the 
actions of those to whom it applied in those contexts in which it does apply. Amongst the issue 
which arose were that, firstly, of whether the language of ‘serious risk’ which the Guidance 
repeatedly used – in, for example, setting the threshold to escalate matters to senior staff or 
Ministers – accurately reflected the applicable legal test? The question was considered by the 
High Court in a judicial review brought by the Equalities and Human Rights Commission shortly 
after the Guidance was first published. There, it was argued that the appropriate test was in fact 
‘real risk’, and that by using the language of ‘serious risk’ the Guidance left open the possibility 
both that the UK would breach its international obligations and that an individual intelligence 
                                                     
46 Principles (n 1) [6(d)]. 
47 Investigatory Powers Commissioner (n 2). 
48 Joint Committee on Human Rights, The Government’s policy on the use of drones for targeted killing (2015-16, 
HL 141, HC 574), [24]-[25]. 
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officer would commit an offence under domestic law.49 This was rejected by the Divisional 
Court, two of whose reasons for that conclusion are of note. First, it said, the Guidance was 
‘intended to give practical guidance to intelligence officers on the ground’: 
 
It is not a treatise on English criminal law. What matters is how the document would be 
read and applied by individual intelligence officers, not how it would fare at the Law 
Commission or in a University Graduate Law School.50 
 
Moreover, ‘the Guidance does not promise that officers whose actions are consistent with the 
Guidance will be immune from personal liability.’ Rather: 
 
It says that they have good reason to be confident. And, although the Guidance claims to 
set out principles which are consistent with UK domestic law, it is not a legal treatise nor 
a judgment of the Court of Appeal Criminal Division on particular facts. It is entitled to 
convey the sense of the relevant principles (which it does) in language suitable to its 
purpose… That said, we are confident that no individual officer would be successfully 
prosecuted, in this jurisdiction at least, because he judged that a risk of torture or CIDT 
was not serious, but when he would have judged that the same risk was real.51 
 
Nevertheless, the revised document makes the change argued for, using the threshold of ‘real 
risk’ rather than ‘serious risk’, because – as the Investigatory Powers Commissioner said upon its 
publication – ‘[t]his is the test which is generally applied in equivalent contexts and, in my view, 
ensures that the document aligns with international law’.52 Though this change of language might 
close the gap identified between law and non-law, the Principles remains underdetermined. The 
Consolidated Guidance was supplemented by a range of more detailed material specific to each of 
the relevant bodies, and which was not made publicly available. The existence and secrecy of that 
supplementary material, however, not only prevented the Guidance fulfilling its secondary aim – 
that of promoting public confidence – but may also, depending on its content, have prevented it 
from fulfilling its primary aim of ensuring UK personnel do not act unlawfully. This relative 
indeterminacy continues even after the revision of the document: The Principles provides that 
‘each organisation to whom these Principles apply will continue to provide more detailed advice 
                                                     
49 Equality and Human Rights Commission v Prime Minister & Ors [2011] EWHC 2401 (Admin). 
50 [2011] EWHC 2401 (Admin), [61]. 
51 [2011] EWHC 2401 (Admin), [64]. 




and guidance to their personnel where such material is necessary to describe precisely how the 
principles and requirements set out in this document should operate within their individual 
organisation’ but that ‘such advice and guidance shall not qualify these Principles’.53 
 
 Related to this difficulty with identifying the point at which one could proceed 
compatibly with the Consolidated Guidance was the room which the Guidance made for attempting 
to reduce the risk of torture and mistreatment via the seeking of assurances from foreign 
partners about how they will and will not treat those in their custody. Reliance on such 
assurances has caused problems in the past: in its report on Michael Adebolajo, the Intelligence 
and Security Committee accused the SIAs of not responding properly to his allegations of 
mistreatment, having viewed them ‘in the context of assurances given before the allegations were 
made and by an organisation whose credibility they were not in a position to evaluate.’54 Even 
this was called into doubt by the Intelligence Services Commissioner’s report on the same 
matter: 
 
Although SIS claimed to the ISC and me that Intelligence Officers 1-2 sought and 
obtained assurances from the Kenyans as to the treatment of Mr Adebolajo while he was 
in custody, I am not satisfied that they did this, although I cannot rule it out. There is no 
contemporaneous documentary evidence to support this claim and SIS made it without 
consulting Intelligence Officer 1 at all and after consulting Intelligence Officer 2 only 
“briefly”. I interviewed both officers and, although they both thought they should and 
would have sought such assurances, neither had any recollection of doing so or telling 
SIS that they did.55 
 
He therefore recommended that ‘thought be given to’ a number of points, including 
‘documentation of and language used in assurances, differentiation of different liaison services 
involved in relevant operations anad recognition that separate assessments of risk and assurances 
may be appropriate.’56 The Commissioner also noted that in ‘confidential reports to the Prime 
Minister and discussions with the intelligence services’ he had previously emphasised ‘the 
                                                     
53 Principles (n 1) Foreword. See also Investigatory Powers Commissioner (n 2): ‘Although I am strongly 
supportive of transparency and I encourage public bodies to make as much information available as they 
are able… I consider that this should be achieved voluntarily rather than by way of a formal requirement. 
I recognise that there are significant operational sensitivities that make a blanket obligation in this area 
undesirable and possibly unworkable.’ 
54 ISC (n 27) [BBB]. 
55 Waller (n 32) [6.5(2)]. 
56 Waller (n 32) [21.3(1)]. 
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importance of recording assurances in writing if they are to be relied upon and of undertaking 
and recording a considered assessment of such assurances and compliance with them.’57  
 
This point about the status of assurances is important: the ISC has noted that though 
‘[f]rom the way in which assurances are referred to in the Consolidated Guidance, it might 
reasonably be assumed that these are formal written agreements’ – of a sort familiar from the 
context of deportation with assurances – that is in fact rarely the case.58 Mostly the assurances are 
verbal, with the SIAs arguing that written assurances are often no more reliable than are verbal 
assurances, and that to seek the former indicates a lack of trust in overseas partners which may 
undermine cooperation. The ISC accepted these points, reaffirming the Commissioner’s 
recommendation that ‘where it is not possible to obtain a written assurance from a liaison 
partner, a written record of the oral assurance should be produced and sent to the liaison partner 
so that there is a shared understanding of expectations.’59 The Principles, in outlining the matters 
to consider when determining the value of assurances, identifies ‘[t]he manner in which the 
assurance is given, or caveat is agreed, for instance whether it is written’ but nevertheless stresses 
that ‘it is not a prerequisite that they are in writing.’60 It further provides that if an assurance is 
not given in writing ‘personnel must keep an accurate record of any discussions and, whenever 
feasible, should share it with the foreign authority as a formal note as soon as is practicable.’61 
Though the very idea of relying upon assurances might be called into question for the reason 
noted by Lord Phillips in the context of ‘deportation with assurances’ – ‘if you need to ask for 
assurances you cannot rely on them’62 – the revised document is a clear improvement over its 
predecessor in terms of how it treats such assurances.  
 
A final, but crucial, issue related to the point at which the Guidance, as it were, wan out. 
The crucial paragraph of the Guidance as published in 2010 left this point ambiguous, and has 
been the source of much of the confusion and suspicion with which the Guidance was treated. It 
is therefore worth quoting in full: 
 
We take great care to assess whether there is a risk that a detainee will be subjected to 
mistreatment and consider whether it is possible to mitigate any such risk. In 
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circumstances where, despite efforts to mitigate the risk, a serious risk of torture at the 
hands of a third party remains, our presumption would be that we will not proceed.63 
 
The key question here related to what happened in the gap left by the presumption noted. In the 
different scenarios to which the Guidance applied, the basic principle in each case was that where 
there was a serious risk of torture – and in some situations, also of CIDT – the relevant Minister 
(probably in most if not all cases the Foreign Secretary) was to be notified or consulted. What 
the Guidance did not make clear was whether it was open to the Minister to decide that the 
relevant agency should proceed in its interactions (of whatever sort) with the partner agency 
where such a risk existed.64 The ISC has noted that different Foreign Secretaries have different 
understandings of their role in this context. Though MI6 had stated to the Committee that cases 
in which there a serious risk of torture ‘would not have got anywhere near’ Ministers,65 Boris 
Johnson offered an absolutist understanding of the prohibition that was not shared by Theresa 
May and Amber Rudd (both of whom have been Home Secretary) or Philip Hammond 
(Johnson’s predecessor as Foreign Secretary).66 The latter accepted that the Guidance left it open 
to him to authorise torture in extreme circumstances: 
 
[I]f I became aware of the presence of a weapon of mass destruction in the capital city of 
a power that is known to regularly use torture and have reason to believe that it’s about 
to detonate and can disclose to that power the location, whereabouts of the individuals, 
clearly I’d have to make a judgement about whether the protection of their human rights 
outweighed the human rights of the possibly thousands of people that could be killed or 
injured as a consequence of the explosion occurring.67  
 
This is, with respect to Johnson, clearly a better reading of the terms of the Guidance: the fact that 
not proceeding was designated a mere presumption rather than a rule implied beyond any 
conceivable doubt that it was open to a Minister to whom a case was brought to order that 
cooperation continue notwithstanding that it had been assessed that there was a serious risk of 
torture resulting. This reading was confirmed by an internal MI5 policy note obtained by the 
Rendition Project, which made clear that intelligence sharing could take place even where there 
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exists a serious risk of torture which cannot be mitigated, if the relevant Minister agrees that ‘the 
potential benefits justify accepting the risk and the legal consequences which may follow’.68  
 
This possibility is similarly left open by the revised Principles, with the document now 
distinguishing the two situations noted above: where, on one hand, personnel know or believe 
that unlawful killing, torture, or extraordinary rendition will take place and, on the other, where 
there is a ‘real risk’ of a wider category of events, including not only unlawful killing, torture and 
extraordinary rendition, but also ‘ordinary’ rendition, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, 
unacceptable standards of arrest and detention. In the former case, the Principles require that 
personnel not proceed and that Ministers be informed.69 In the latter case, however, personnel 
may still proceed if one of two conditions are met: either their judgment has been overruled by 
more senior actors, or the real risk has been mitigated below that threshold by the sorts of 
caveats and assurances referenced above.70 If neither condition is met, the result is not that no 
action must be taken, but rather that the matter must be referred to Ministers. Though the 
Principles outlines at length the considerations that Ministers will take into account in deciding 
whether or not to proceed,71 doing so only underlines the fact that Ministers might – compatibly 
with the revised document, as with its predecessor – authorise conduct which brings with it a 
real risk of, amongst other things, torture and unlawful killing.72 
 
This fact has implications for the liability both of those who carry out the actual 
cooperation, be it the passing of intelligence or of questions for interrogators, and the Minister 
themselves. These issues as they are dealt with in domestic law will be discussed further below. 
Given that the prohibition on torture is absolute, however, it is necessary to note at this stage 
that Ministerial authorisation cannot by itself negate any violation of international law which may 
result from it. What may save a Minister, though, is that UNCAT does not itself make complicity 
in torture unlawful, while the sort of complicity in torture foreseen, however obliquely, by the 
Guidance and now the Principles are not, as a result of the jurisdiction point considered above, 
likely to be incompatible with the ECHR. It is nevertheless notable that while the Ministerial 
Code – which within the UK constitutional order acts as a conventional limit upon the deeds of 
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Ministers – previously contained the reference to ‘the overarching duty on Ministers to comply 
with the law including international law and treaty obligations’, it was revised in late 2015 to refer 
instead, more narrowly, to ‘the overarching duty on Ministers to comply with the law’.73 
Permission to bring a judicial review of the amendment was refused both at first instance and by 
the Court of Appeal,74 in part because the change of wording was considered (unconvincingly) 
not to have altered the underlying position whereby ‘the law’ by which Ministers must abide 
includes international law. Nevertheless, the underlying issue remains: the Principles appears to 
accommodate circumstances in which UK personnel will be complicit, morally and perhaps 
legally, in torture. Though the Principles is an improvement on the Consolidated Guidance in that it 
seeks to guide how Ministers make the ultimate decisions in this area and so comes much closer 
to a clear recognition of the fact that such decisions will at times be made, the bare problem 
remains. 
  
5. Oversight and compliance 
 
Oversight of the Consolidated Guidance/Principles is carried out (now) by the Investigatory Powers 
Commissioner, to whom a direction was given under the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 in 
August 2017,75 and as we have seen above the IPC was charged with reviewing the Consolidated 
Guidance as part of the process by which it became the Principles. One result of that process is 
worth noting. The Government, in its announcement of the result of the revision process, was 
able to bat away criticism that it had ignored the views of civil society actors by saying – 
reasonably – that it was not it that had ignored those views but the IPC: 
 
If Sir Adrian, in his recommendations, chose not to reflect everything that particular civil 
society organisations wished to see, that was a judgment by Sir Adrian, and it was right 
for the Government to rely on the independent commissioner to be the prime source of 
advice to us on these matters.76 
 
                                                     
73 See now, Cabinet Office, Ministerial Code (January 2018) [1.3]. 
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75 Investigatory Powers Commissioner (Additional Directed Oversight Functions) (Consolidated 
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The independent national security actor was in this way used as a shield by the Government 
against criticism of the result. Previously oversight of the Guidance had been carried out by the 
Intelligence Services Commissioner – since 2009 on a non-statutory basis and since November 
2014 in accordance with a direction made under powers introduced by the Justice and Security 
Act 2013.77 Though the Commissioner’s final report noted that both the SIAs and the Ministry 
of Defence have ‘consistently shown that the Consolidated Guidance is being applied 
thoughtfully and that there is a general commitment to continual improvement of process to 
support officers taking decisions in this area’,78 this oversight process has given reason for 
concern. There were reported to the Commissioner 921 cases where the Guidance was 
considered in 2016 (including ‘all recorded cases where the Consolidated Guidance was 
considered, including where the decision was taken that the Guidance did not apply and cases 
where a judgement was made that there was a less than serious risk of CIDT’).79 In isolation, it is 
impossible to know whether this figure is worrying or not. What can be said, however, is that the 
number of errors identified is problematic regardless of the context. The Commissioner 
observed that in the course of his inspections, ‘GCHQ flagged for my attention that they had 
identified a total of 35 instances where [its] response team had not successfully identified that the 
Consolidated Guidance review process should have been followed’ and that further investigation 
had ‘suggested that in eight of these cases, the intelligence should not have been shared.’80  
 
Though voluntary reporting of errors is of course welcome, it is no panacea. First of all, 
there is no way of knowing how many other situations were not subject to the review process in 
question – 35 is a high number of mistakes to be made in a single year. Second, these are not 
merely inconsequential errors of process, but also of substance: the figure of 8 refers to the 
number of occasions on which there was a serious risk of mistreatment and yet, because of the 
procedural failing, intelligence was shared. In each of those cases, the effect of the failure may 
have been to leave SIA officers open to criminal liability. The first report of the Commissioner’s 
successor, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, identified – across all the relevant agencies – 
no cases in which the Guidance was not properly applied.81 The Principles imposes for the first time 
a requirement to report non-compliance with the principles to the Investigatory Powers 
Commissioner, who is charged with determining whether such non-compliance has taken place 
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and assess the seriousness of any non-compliance.82 The Commissioner is permitted – but not 
obliged – by the Principles to refer the matter to the ‘relevant UK authorities’ (and not, by 
implication, foreign or international authorities) where he has ‘concerns’ that criminal conduct 
may have taken place.83 The Principles also includes – where the Guidance did not – a weak 
imploration to UK personnel to ‘whistleblow’ as regards non-compliance with the Principles, 
either internally or directly to the Commissioner, but stops far short of making such action 
mandatory.84 
 
6. The Principles and the law 
 
Though the revision of the Consolidated Guidance goes some way to addressing some of the 
difficulties of its predecessor it does not and could not have, addressed the most objectionable, 
and yet most fundamental, feature of the Guidance: that is, its fundamental status. It was noted 
above that the Principles exist against – and can only be understood in light of – a detailed 
background of both domestic and international law. That is, the Principles, like the Guidance before 
it, is a non-legal document. This in itself is hardly unusual. The UK’s constitutional order relies 
upon non-legal rules to an unusual extent. Some of these are constitutional conventions, whether 
unwritten (and the content of which is therefore subject to dispute) or more or less 
authoritatively codified. Others do not yet have that status, but might one day acquire it. But 
though these non-legal rules, whether or not constitutional conventions, are legion, they differ 
significantly from the Principles in their relationship to law. That is, many of the non-conventional 
non-legal rules have no inherent relationship to law: any substantive overlap is fortuitous and 
contingent. Conventional rules, however, in many cases do not merely overlap with legal rules 
but in fact interact with them. That is, though the courts may not enforce them, key 
constitutional conventions often prescribe how legal powers should be exercised, often working 
so as to bridge the gap between the undemocratic nature of the formal powers (to appoint a 
Prime Minister, say, or grant Royal Assent) and the exigencies of a modern democratic order. 
Others – such as the Ministerial Code and its rules of individual responsibility – consciously 
regulate where the law does not, doing what the law is felt to be ill-suited to doing. The Principles, 
however, do neither of these things. Instead, the document sits atop a legal layer and for all that 
has changed in recent times, this fundamental points remains as it was, and certain difficulties 
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follow from it. Though the Principles purport both to reflect and augment the underlying law, it in 
fact potentially distorts the legal position. 
 
The Principles declares itself to have been ‘designed by reference both to UK domestic 
and international law’ and states that UK personnel ‘whose actions are consistent with these 
Principles have good reason to be confident that they will not risk personal liability in the 
future.’85 Therefore, though it is not law, it nevertheless purports to be compatible with the law. 
As we have seen above, certain of the gaps in the Guidance made that claim difficult to sustain; 
some of those gaps remain in its successor. In the most recent round of reports issued by the 
ISC, however, some further context was offered to the claim regarding legal liability. ‘[W]hen SIS 
or GCHQ refer a Consolidated Guidance case to Ministers’, the Committee noted, ‘they 
routinely seek, in parallel, an authorisation under section 7 of the Intelligence Services Act 1994, 
which can provide protection for their officers from domestic civil and criminal liability as set 
out above’.86 It quoted evidence given to the Committee by SIS: 
 
[W]e are … always going to go for a section 7 authorisation. Because, you know, why 
should my officers carry the risks on behalf of the Government personally? Why should 
they? So, you know, as we have already discussed, serious risk is ultimately a subjective 
judgement. So we will go for belt and braces on this.87 
 
In response to suggestions that the link – which as a matter of practice we now know to exist – 
between the Guidance and section 7 authorisations be made explicit, the Service expressed 
concern, on the basis that ‘[i]f you were to refer explicitly to section 7 authorisation in the 
Consolidated Guidance, it would raise the misguided understanding that section 7 authorises SIS 
to carry out CIDT and torture.’88 Three points might be made in response. First, though it is true 
that section 7 bears no necessary connection to torture, and though it can be used to authorise all 
manner of (less appalling) conduct, it nevertheless must be the case that section 7 could be used 
in such a fashion – certainly, nothing in the language of section 7 excludes it. Indeed, and this is 
the second point, the practice of seeking a section 7 authorisation where referring a matter to a 
Minister in accordance with the Guidance suggests that though the provision may well not be used 
in practice to authorise torture, it is used so as to exclude the possibility of liability for secondary 
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offences in relation to which torture is the primary offence. It is not clear that the moral divide 
between the two things is quite as stark as MI6’s protestations would seem to imply. Third, the 
implication of this claim is that what are effectively PR concerns should be allowed to triumph 
over the creation of conditions in which the public can have an accurate knowledge of what is, 
or might be, done in their name. That is, with respect to those charged with keeping the United 
Kingdom safe, a weak argument. Indeed, it seems not at all implausible that the public would not 
only not object to this use of section 7 authorisations but in fact approve of it strongly, together 
with all it implies: careful decision-making, a utilitarian culture in which public safety is given 
priority over an indirect risk of wrongful action, and a willingness of political figures to take – in 
law and in politics – responsibility for what is done by those on the front line.  
 
The secrecy surrounding this use of section 7 authorisations is in keeping with the 
broader situation where there is relatively little in the public domain about such 7 authorisations 
and their use, and no case law to speak of. In its Privacy and Security report in advance of the 
enactment of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, the ISC noted that MI6 had at that time ‘eight 
class-based Authorisations under Section 7 of the Intelligence Services Act’: 
 
These remove liability under UK law for day-to-day activity undertaken in pursuit of 
SIS’s statutory functions, such as the identification and use of Covert Human Intelligence 
Sources, Directed Surveillance and interference with, and receipt of, property and 
documents.89 
 
In addition to this, MI6 would seek additional and specific authorisations in circumstances where 
‘where an operation may be particularly contentious, pose specific legal issues or else carries 
significant political risks (including through the risk of discovery or attribution)’ or ‘where an 
operation involves the use of a new capability, or where an existing technique is deployed against 
a new set of targets.’90 It is into the first of these two categories, one would presume, that 
authorisations related to activity within the scope of the Consolidated Guidance would fall. 
GCHQ, at the same time, had 5 such class-based authorisations, which ‘remove liability under 
UK law for some activities, including those associated with certain types of intelligence gathering 
and interference with computers, mobile phones and other electronic equipment.’91 In that 
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report, the ISC declared itself satisfied that the various class-based authorisations were ‘required 
in order to allow the Agencies to conduct essential work’ but recommended that, in light of their 
implications for privacy, ‘consideration should therefore be given to greater transparency around 
the number and nature of Section 7 Authorisations.’92 
 
In the report, unpublished for many years, on the Draft Consolidated Guidance, the ISC had 
considered the absence of any reference to section 7 from the Guidance: 
  
When we asked why there was no mention of this clause in the Consolidated Policy, the 
Home Office told us that that it “isn’t a Section 7 document. This is guidance. It doesn’t 
give [officers] exemption from the criminal and civil law. It is purely guidance”. Similarly, 
the Attorney General told us that Section 7 is not mentioned and that “we shouldn’t 
trouble anyone about it”. SIS expressed concern about the handling of issues relating to 
Section 7 because: If you were to refer explicitly to Section 7 authorisations in the 
Consolidated Guidance, it would raise the misguided understanding that Section 7 
authorises SIS to carry out CIDT and torture.93 
 
In its consideration of this point, the ISC linked it to its own previous recommendation about 
the need for greater transparency as to the use of section 7: 
 
[W]e have previously recommended that there should be greater transparency around the 
use of section 7 authorisations and that the scope and purpose of section 7 
authorisations should explicitly be addressed in the Consolidated Guidance, and we 
strongly urge the Government to reconsider this recommendation.94 
 
The Principles furthers our understanding of this matter only minimally. It acknowledges the 
existence of section 7, stating that the procedures laid out there ‘should be followed 
notwithstanding the fact that an authorisation under section 7 of the Intelligence Services Act 
1994 may be granted.’95 That is, the Principles supplements, rather than merely reflecting, the 
underlying law, and so continues to apply even where there is no possibility of legal liability, and 
so no contribution to be made to the task of avoiding it.  
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Section 7 of the 1994 Act has a number of possible counterparts at common law, chief 
amongst them the doctrines of Crown and Foreign act of state. The former renders non-
justiciable in domestic courts acts which are ‘an exercise of sovereign power, inherently 
governmental in nature’ which are ‘done outside the United Kingdom’;96 the latter the acts of 
state of foreign states under certain circumstances.97 Each, however, has features which renders it 
of dubious utility to those concerned about incurring legal liability due to direct or indirect 
involvement in mistreatment of detainees or others. Like section 7, the doctrine of Crown act of 
state applies only, the leading case makes clear, to acts done abroad and only do those done with 
the authorisation of (or subsequently adopted by) the government of the day, such that the act 
belongs to the state rather than to the individual who does it.98 However, in that case – relating 
to alleged British involvement in the rendition and mistreatment of a Libyan dissident and his 
wife – the Government accepted that ‘it cannot apply to acts of torture, even supposing that the 
Government of the United Kingdom would ever authorise or ratify such acts.’99 The judgments 
of the Supreme Court varied in the explanation they offered for this fact. On one hand, Lady 
Hale, read this as ‘an acknowledgement that such acts are not inherently governmental’ and so 
could not fall within the scope of the doctrine.100 Without having to decide the point, Lord 
Sumption expressed reservations as to this reading, for, both as an ‘international crime and a 
statutory offence in the United Kingdom, torture is by definition a governmental act.’ He 
therefore preferred to explain the point by reference to the domestic legality: 
 
Given the strength of the English public policy on the subject, a decision by the United 
Kingdom government to authorise or ratify torture or maltreatment would not as a 
matter of domestic English law be a lawful exercise of the royal prerogative. It could not 
therefore be an act of state. Nor would there be any inconsistency with the proper 
functions of the executive in treating it as giving rise to civil liability.101 
 
Regardless of which explanation is preferred, however, it is clear that many acts which fall short 
of torture are nevertheless both unlawful and potentially will result in a breach of the Principles, 
and so a gap is left through which Crown act of state might yet prove of some value to the 
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government here. A further issue therefore arises: Crown act of state has in the past been applied 
principally, perhaps exclusively, to acts whose wrongfulness is a matter of private law. Can it also 
apply in the criminal context, as it would need to do if any useful reliance is to be placed upon it 
in this context? Notwithstanding certain dicta of Lady Hale in Rahmatullah,102 the better answer 
must be no: there is no clear authority for the existence of Crown act of state in the criminal 
sphere, and for the courts to extend it thereto would be inappropriate.103  
 
What, more briefly, of Foreign Act of State? Efforts to seek legal accountability for UK 
involvement in drone strikes carried out by foreign partners have been stymied by the fact that 
for the courts to pronounce of the legality of information sharing in this context will inevitably 
involve a simultaneous condemnation of the act of killing itself – a fact which brings into play 
the doctrine of foreign act of state, which is in practice likely to obstruct litigation on the point.104 
Here too, however, the courts have recognised a broad, and growing, public policy exception 
which would seem to encompass both jus cogen norms of international law (amongst them the 
prohibition on torture) as well as breaches of fundamental rights.105 The effect is that, as proved 
to be the case in Behlaj, it should not be possible to use the doctrine to exclude legal liability that 
would arise as a result of complicity in the torture or mistreatment (at least if significant) of 
detainees or others. These doctrines are all rules of domestic law. There is also an international 
law dimension, which can be discussed more briefly. Though there exists the possibility of 
derogating from the Convention on Human Rights, it is not possible to derogate from Article 3, 
which prohibits both torture and inhuman and degrading treatment.   
 
The effect of these various points is that the relationship between the Principles and the 
law must be adjudged to be problematic. There were a number of points at which the Consolidated 
Guidance appears to distort – perhaps even to misrepresent – the underlying legal rules. Which is 
not of course to suggest bad faith: any form of proxy for the legal rules is likely to do so to a 
greater or lesser degree, and – all things told – the Guidance perhaps did so rather less than might 
have been the case. And one of the key problems of the document – the formulation of the 
relevant legal test – has been addressed in its revision. Nevertheless, these points call into 
question the very nature of the Principles, for it means that in trying to adhere to the document 
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there is the possibility, first, that the law is nevertheless broken, or, secondly but more generally, 
that the legal rules come to be overlooked, with the law’s proxy coming to take the place of law. 
In this way, the nature and status of the law – the fact that, as law, it has a normativity which is 
distinct from, and higher than, mere ‘guidance’ or even ‘principles’ – is implicitly diminished by 
the document, not only by the fact that is bears an occasionally loose a relationship to the 
applicable legal rules but also by its very existence. The Principles potentially works to discourage 
a close focus on the relevant legal rules, their content and their evolution over time, which is not 
– because it cannot be – automatically reflected in the content of the overlaying document. As 
such, though the efforts made to update the Guidance are of course welcome, even if the process 
by which that updating took place was often not, the fundamental difficulty remains. Not only 
does the Principles fall short in making sure that the SIAs operate ‘consistently’ with their legal 
obligations, but it may on occasion, by drawing focus from what the law requires, in fact increase 




There is no problem with the co-existence of law and non-law in the same policy space. For any 
number of reasons, we may want to regulate the same matter simultaneously using tools which 
are, both in terms of their form and their substance, distinct. Nevertheless, in the context of the 
Consolidated Guidance and now the Principles, the coexistence is concerning on a number of fronts. 
For one, it is not mere co-existence: these documents sit on top of the law in a way which 
distracts from the latter’s content, with the gap between the two filled by the use of section 7 
authorisations whose nature and use continues to be shrouded in secrecy, and which have – 
almost uniquely – survived unreformed the process of rationalisation provoked, ultimately, by 
the Snowden revelations of 2013. In particular, these documents, with their principles, 
prohibitions and processes, are not only potentially narrower than the law – giving false 
reassurance to those who act in accordance with it – but also broader, encompassing conduct 
that one would expect to be illegal but is not. It distracts from the specific, sometimes contested, 
content of the law, allowing those acting in accordance with it to give themselves the benefit of 
the doubt that they should in fact be confronting head on. This mismatch risks turning the 
Principles, like the Guidance before it, into something more like a propaganda tool, offering the 
impression of virtue even where the reality is less edifying, and glossing over the fact that the law 
seems to permit conduct by Ministers which one might rather it did not.106 There is an attempt, 
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as so often in this area of policy, to reap political rewards without paying the countervailing 
political costs.  
 
This ambiguity carries over into the oversight of compliance with the Principles. Such 
oversight was introduced belatedly, and is carried out by an actor, the IPC, whose constitutional 
importance derives from the fact that he or she is legally-expert, both reviewing compliance with 
legal points in contexts in which the courts are unlikely ever to be called upon to adjudicate and 
reviewing the operation of the regime in the round, rather than on a purely individual basis. 
These lines are blurred in the context of the Principles, which is not a legal document and many of 
whose key terms are not legal terms. The effect is that rather than the legality of the relevant 
bodies work being considered, what is addressed is instead is their ability and willingness to 
comply with what is in effect a rather crude flow chart. Though this is better than nothing, it is a 
very poor substitute for law as interpreted and applied by courts. It is therefore of particular 
concern that the improved oversight of the Principles as compared to its predecessor nevertheless 
leaves open the possibility that apparently criminal conduct will not be referred by the IPC to the 
relevant authorities. Though the Principles co-exists with law, the prospect of litigation in this 
sphere is vanishingly small: the Government fought to very hard to ensure the Belhaj case was 
not litigated, and even if it had been, it would have been litigated behind closed doors, with the 
key factual conclusions pronounced only in a closed judgment. All of which is to say that though 
the practice in this area is clearly improved by the recent reforms, the inherent limits of the 
approach are very great, and are no substitute for a clear legal framework which is consistently 
and assiduously enforced. 
